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Travelers in the United States are decreasingly aware of the fact
that they cross state lines in their journeys. The indistinct, and some-
what arbitrary, lines which mark many of the divisions between the
soil of one state and that of another are little-noticed by passengers in
coast-to-coast jet airliners racing the sun across the continent. Even
the more distinct boundary lines laid out along rivers and other natural
features pass by unseen. Wanderers on trains and buses pass swiftly
from state to state without thinking of state boundaries. Automobile
excursionists will soon speed across the continent on a completed in-
terstate highway network without pausing to have their picture re-
corded before the sign which explains the pavement's change in color
or texture. However, if the driver fails to adjust the pressure on the
accelerator to comply with a lower speed limit, a police siren will soon
signify that a state boundary was crossed. Our corporations do busi-
ness in many states, although incorporated in only one.
This great mobility of our population and the interstate nature of
our business, all of which takes place without regard to state lines,
paradoxically has increased the significance of these state boundaries
for lawyers, judges, and students and teachers of law. No person in-
terested in litigation either as a judge, a counsellor, a student or a
teacher, is unaware of the significance of these state lines. Their exist-
ence is chiefly responsible for bringing to the American legal system the
numerous problems which have come to be known as "Conflicts." Be-
cause of a recent Supreme Court decision,' the existence of these
boundaries has become painfully clear to the many state legislators
interested in effectuating their state's title to, or custody of, various
classes of unclaimed, abandoned, or ownerless property. In 1961 the
Supreme Court, acting as the policeman of the federal system, blew
the whistle upon the efforts of many state legislatures, all speeding to
gain control of the millions of dollars of unclaimed property which
exists in the United States.
Anyone unacquainted with the facts might suppose that little
ownerless property existed within the United States, and that litigation
would not require the services of the highest court in the land. Such
is not the case. Estimates and reliable records demonstrate that more
than a few hundred dollars are involved. One authority estimated the
total value of abandoned property in the United States as of January
Professor of Law, University of Nebraska.
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1962 was $15,000,000,000 and expanding at the rate of $1,000,000,000
a year.2 During a thirteen-year period, New York collected $38,-
500,000; Michigan collected $7,500,000 in ten years; Massachusetts
collected $2,500,000 during the first year's operation of its statute; and
Pennsylvania collected $5,000,000 in seven years. California experts
estimated their state would gross between $30,000,000 and $100,000,-
000 by enacting a comprehensive abandoned property law.'
Naturally, the first several years after the enactment of an aban-
doned property law are the most remunerative to the state. During
that period the law will bring to the state ownerless property which has
accumulated over a period of a great many years. Figures show, how-
ever, that even after the initial peak years, a state may expect to collect
sizeable sums. For example, New Jersey grossed $1,175,000 in 1957-
eleven years after it enacted comprehensive legislation.4
About a decade and a half ago doubt was expressed that revenue
gained from the enactment of state abandoned property statutes would
amount to much. At the same time it was suggested that the purpose
behind the enactments was the desire to place abandoned property in
a place of safekeeping until the owner appeared.5 Time has shown this
jaundiced view of the value of abandoned property statutes as a source
of revenue to be unwarranted, and that the revenue prospects of such
legislation are uppermost in the minds of legislators. Also a few years
ago doubts about the suitability of an abandoned property statute as a
revenue measure rested upon the argument that the amount gathered
by a state would be so uncertain that fiscal experts could not budget
against the income.0 Experience under several state statutes which have
been in existence long enough to pass the initial, peak years indicates
(1) that following the initial period, the statutes provide a fairly defi-
nite return; (2) that the expense of administering abandoned property
statutes does not exhaust the value of the abandoned property; and
(3) that some portion of the abandoned property will be claimed by
owners after the state has taken custody. Mention of New Jersey's
experience eleven years after it enacted comprehensive legislation al-
ready has been made. Experts predicted that California might expect
2 Wall Street Journal, Jan. 22, 1962, p. 1, col. 1, cited in "The Supreme Court, 1961
Term," 76 Harv. L. Rev. 54, 132 n.218 (1962).
3 McBride, "Unclaimed Dividends, Escheat Statutes and the Corporation Lawyer,"
14 Bus. Law. 1062, 1066 (1959). See Note, 42 Iowa L. Rev. 399, 400 n.5 (1957).
4 McBride, supra note 3, at 1067.
5 Garrison, "Escheats, Abandoned Property Acts, and Their Revenue Aspects," 35
Ky. L.J. 302 (1947).
6 Ibid.
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$5,000,000 or more each year from a comprehensive act.7 Pennsyl-
vania collected $743,577 in 1955; $1,006,263 in 1956; and $1,276,294
in 1957.8
New Jersey employs three full-time employees with total salaries
of less than $14,000 annually. In cases where New Jersey was forced
to collect abandoned property by suit, litigation expenses amounted to
no more than twenty-five to thirty-five per cent of the value of
the property recovered. In Kentucky, the interest which the state
derived each year from the funds collected paid for more than one-half
the costs of administering the program. New York's collection costs
were about two and one-half per cent of the gross recovered.9
Refunds to claimants generally average between ten and fifteen
per cent.' In view of this general refund experience, several state
statutes cover into the general fund a certain percentage of the aban-
doned property, placing the balance (usually twenty-five per cent) in
a fund from which claimants are paid."
Considering the large sums involved, the fact that the annual
amount may be predicted with some certainty after a few years of ex-
perience, the small collection costs, and the low refund rate, it is
apparent why many states within the past decade have passed laws
pertaining to abandoned property. Since World War II, states have
searched for new sources of revenue to meet the increasing costs of
state government occasioned by the general price rise and their citizens'
demands for more services. Abandoned and unclaimed property pro-
vided an easy source of revenue, and securing such property is particu-
larly attractive to legislators because the owner of the property is un-
known and the present custodian's right to continued possession lacks
an equitable base. Opponents of the statutes are either nonexistent or
lack any solid arguments to oppose enactment.
Today, twenty-five jurisdictions have comprehensive unclaimed
property acts.' Ten of these have the Uniform Disposition of Un-
claimed Property Act, with some slight, but not always unimportant,
7 McBride, supra note 3, at 1066.
8 Ely, "Pennsylvania Escheat Laws: Proposals for Revision," 64 Dick. L. Rev. 329,
330 (1960).
9 McBride, supra note 3, at 1066-1068.
10 Ibid.
11 See, e.g., Nev. Rev. Stat. § 690.260 (1955); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17:34-54 (Supp.
1962).
12 Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho,
Illinois, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, New




variations.13 Twenty-seven jurisdictions (twenty-five states, Puerto
Rico and the District of Columbia) do not have comprehensive legis-
lation on the subject, although most of these jurisdictions do have some
statutory provisions dealing with certain types of unclaimed or aban-
doned property. 14 Every state (and Puerto Rico and the District of
Columbia) has a general provision providing that the property of a dece-
dent dying intestate, without heirs, passes to the state. The unclaimed or
abandoned property acts, however, proceed upon a different theory
than statutes escheating property of a decedent dying intestate without
heirs. The latter presupposes proof that the owner is dead and a pro-
bate of his estate to determine the absence of heirs. Even with the
assistance of either a statutory or common-law presumption that un-
explained absence for a certain number of years is equal to proof of
death, the cumbersome probate procedure must be followed prior to the
state receiving the absentee's property by way of escheat. On the other
hand, the abandoned property statutes do not proceed upon the hypoth-
esis that the owner is dead-merely that he is not exercising his rights
of ownership or possession and that the state will intervene to vest in
itself the possession or ownership.
A few of the abandoned property statutes vest immediately full
title in the state, and cut off the rights of the absentee ever to regain the
property or its value; other state statutes cut off the owner's rights after
a certain period of years. Other statutes permit the owner (or his heirs)
to recover the property or its value at any time in the future, no
matter how remote. Statutes permitting claimants to recover the prop-
erty or its value at any time are usually termed custodial statutes,
whereas state laws cutting off ownership and possessory rights after a
certain period of time (which may be as short as a few months, or as
long as forty years) are escheat-type statutes.
The trend has been in the direction of custodial-type statutes,
This is true even for statutes escheating property upon proof that
the owner is deceased or that he has been missing for a specified num-
ber of years. Several of these state statutes provide that the owner or
his heirs are entitled to the property if claim is made within a certain
number of years after the state escheats the property. The Uniform
13 9A Uniform Laws Ann. 253 (1957). Arizona, California, Florida, Idaho, Illinois,
New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Virginia, and Washington.
14 Alabama, Alaska, Colorado, District of Columbia, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Hampshire, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
1963]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Absence as Evidence of Death and Absentee's Property Act permits the
owner or his heirs to recover the property at any time.15
Some states have abandoned property statutes of both types, al-
though usually applicable to different classes of property. Of the
twenty-five states having comprehensive abandoned property statutes,
only four have strictly escheat-type statutes.'6 New Jersey, Pennsyl-
vania and Wisconsin have statutes of both types, possibly with some
overlapping.
These statutes reach a variety of types of property, most of it in-
tangible. For example, without attempting to make the list exhaustive
nor to suggest that all of the twenty-five states mentioned as having
comprehensive unclaimed property legislation escheat all of the follow-
ing, the types of intangible property specifically mentioned in state
statutes are: checking account deposits in commercial banks, state
and federal; savings bank deposits, both time and demand; deposits
or share accounts in savings and loan associations and building and
loan associations; deposits with credit unions, state and federal; corp-
orate shares and dividends declared with reference to them; dividends
or shares payable upon corporation liquidations, voluntary and in-
voluntary; co-operative dividends or rebates; uncashed pari-mutuel
race tickets; public utility rate rebates or deposit refunds; life in-
surance claims based upon life or endowment policies, or upon annuity
contracts; bond payments, either interest or principal, issued by private
or public corporations; contents of safety deposit boxes; property held
by trustees, corporate or otherwise, payable to a settlor or beneficiary;
property held by state or federal courts and arising out of a variety of
legal proceedings; property of deceased inmates of state and federal
institutions; tax refunds, state and federal; property held by bailees;
land condemnation awards; lost, embezzled, or stolen property; wit-
ness and juror fees; unpaid wages and deductions from pay checks;
uncashed negotiable checks, money orders and travelers' checks;
uncashed warrants issued by governmental authorities, local, state and
federal; unclaimed bequests; funds of "subversive" organizations;
guardianship accounts; workmen's compensation awards; deposits
under state motor vehicle safety responsibility acts; telegraphed
money; court costs; and postal savings accounts.
The common law, of course, provided rules for the disposition of
personal property which was ownerless. The ancient doctrine of bona
vacantia decreed that certain ownerless property belonged to the
15 9 Uniform Laws Ann. 5 (1957). This act is in force in Maryland, Tennessee and
Wisconsin.
1' Arkansas, Connecticut, Hawaii and Minnesota.
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Crown. State courts in the United States might have held that the
doctrine of bona vacantia was applicable and that ownerless property
of the types mentioned in the preceeding paragraph belonged to the
state. This turned out not to be the course of history. At least one
court held the doctrine was not part of the common law of a state, 17 and
another court held that the doctrine applied only to property which
the state could specifically describe.' 8 The latter court, in addition,
refused to require a holder of ownerless property, largely intangible in
nature, to answer interrogatories designed to provide the information
the state needed to describe the property. Thus, since the doctrine of
bona vacantia proved to be unavailing, and because treating the prop-
erty as belonging to a person who had died intestate without heirs in-
volved cumbersome and expensive probate proceedings brought for
each absentee, state legislatures enacted the unclaimed or abandoned
property statutes.
The most perplexing conflict problem of current importance
presented by the abandoned property acts is that of "multiple escheat."
Phrased another way, it is: Which state, or states, have the power to
claim abandoned property? The issue arises whether the state statutes
involved are "escheat" or "custodial" in operation. Let us explore
briefly the past and present state of the law as reflected by Supreme
Court opinions, and then what further developments appear likely in
the area of the states' power to escheat intangibles.
The first case, Security Savings Bank v. California,19 did not in-
volve multiple-state claims, but the opinion contained reasoning which
later led to trouble. California brought an action to compel a bank
to transfer to the state deposits which had remained unclaimed for
more than twenty years. The bank was a California corporation, with
its only place of business in California. Neither the last-known, nor
current, addresses of the depositors were stated. The named defendants
were the bank and the depositors. The bank was served personally; the
depositors, by publication. Only the bank defended. The bank lost
in the California state courts and contended in the United States
Supreme Court that the California escheat action was obnoxious to the
due process clause of the federal constitution. The bank contended that
if the proceeding was in personam, depositors who were nonresidents of
California were not bound because they were served only by publica-
17 Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Slattery, 102 F.2d 58 (7th Cir. 1939). See Comment, 34
Ill. L. Rev. 171 (1939).
Is Arkansas v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 212 Ark. 530, 206 S.W.2d 771 (1947), noted,
2 Ark. L. Rev. 416 (1948).
19 263 U.S. 282 (1923).
19631
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
tion,20 and that if the proceeding be considered in rem or quasi-in-rem,
nonresident depositors were not bound because there was no seizure of
the res at the beginning of the lawsuit." Accordingly, the bank con-
tended that however the proceedings were characterized, the judgment
ordering the bank to transfer the dormant accounts to the state would
not bind nonresident depositors. The bank urged that a judgment com-
pelling it to transfer deposits to the state was lacking in due process if
that judgment did not provide the bank a good defense in a suit brought
by the depositors.
The Court rejected the bank's argument, stating that nothing con-
stitutional turned upon whether the proceedings were called in rem or
quasi-in-rem. The important thing, according to the opinion, was that
in either in rem or quasi-in-rem proceedings, the state seized the res at
the beginning of the law suit. The Court stated: "Seizure of the de-
posit is effected by the personal service made upon the bank,"22 and
further that "there is no constitutional objection to considering the
proceeding as in personam, as far as concerns the bank; as quasi in rem,
so far as concerns the depositors; and as strictly in rem, so far as con-
cerns other claimants."23 Thus, the Court held: "If the deposit is
turned over to the state, in obedience to a valid law, the obligation of
the bank to the depositor is discharged." 4
As stated at the outset, no rival state claims were actually involved
in the Security Bank case. In fact, since the bank was a California
corporation with its only place of business in California and the where-
abouts of the depositors unknown, it is difficult to identify what other
state might have had a colorable right to escheat the same deposits.
But however this might be, there was no other state suggesting it had
power to escheat the deposits. The language of the Court, and the
theory used to answer the bank's due process objection, led naturally
to the conclusion that the proceeding in California barred all other
claimants, whether the claimant was another sovereign state, creditor,
lien holder, heir of the depositor or some other type of claimant. The
Court did say that the proceeding was in rem as to other claimants, and
that personal service upon the bank effected a seizure of the deposits. A
logical deduction from the holding, therefore, was that California had
seized a res and thus obtained jurisdiction to determine the rights of the
whole world with respect to that res.2 5 Although the Court did not
20 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
21 Ibid.
22 Security Say. Bank v. California, 263 U.S. 282, 287 (1923).
23 Ibid.
24 Id. at 286.
25 See Restatement, Judgments, Introductory Note, ch. 1; §§ 2, 3, 32, 73, 75 (1942).
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specifically so state, the opinion certainly could be read as holding that
the case was no different from one where California seized a tangible
piece of property within its borders and adjudicated the ownership
or custody of that tangible property.
At the time of the Security Bank opinion, perhaps the Supreme
Court was unaware of the problems presented by the competing
escheat claims of states other than California, and did not consciously
intend to treat the action as in rem and binding on all claimants even
where one claimant was another state seeking to escheat the same de-
posits. By the time Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Moore6
appeared on the Court's docket, the Court was well aware of the prob-
lems presented by two or more states seeking to escheat the same in-
tangibles. Nine insurance companies, incorporated in states other
than New York, brought suit under the New York Declaratory Judg-
ment Act for a declaration that the New York Abandoned Property
Law was invalid. The courts of New York sustained the power of New
York to take custody of all sums due upon life insurance policies issued
for delivery in New York on the lives of New York residents.27 The
New York Court of Appeals clearly held that New York's power to
take custody was not affected by the fact that the insured might have
become domiciled in another state subsequent to the date the policy
was issued and delivered. Nor did the New York court deem material
the domicile of the beneficiary (if other than the insured) either at the
time the policy was issued or subsequently, and neither did the fact
that the insurance companies were incorporated outside New York
worry the court.
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, but only in part. The
affirmance was limited to a holding that New York possessed the power
to take custody of sums due upon life insurance policies "issued for
delivery in New York upon the lives of persons then resident therein
where the insured continues to be a resident and the beneficiary is a
resident at the maturity of the policy."2 What about the rights of
other states to escheat these same sums? The Court stated: "The
problem of what another state than New York may do is not before us.
That question is not passed upon. 9
The partial affirmance was certainly a hollow victory for New
York. The superiority of New York's claim over those of other states
was not passed upon; New York was given the green light to take from
.26 333 U.S. 541 (1948).
27 Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 297 N.Y. 1, 74 N.E.2d 24 (1947).
23 Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, supra note 26, at 550.
29 Id. at 548.
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the companies custody of sums due upon policies issued for delivery in
New York, insuring lives of New York residents if the insured con-
tinued to reside in New York until the policy matured, and if the bene-
ficiary was a New York resident at the maturity date.
The opinion decided so little, one is forced to agree with Justice
Frankfurter, who dissented, that it was hardly worth the Court's
labors. The fact was that more states were enacting statutes dealing
with abandoned property. Hence, the real issue on the horizon was the
rights of competing states-not the power of a single state to take
custody from the insurance company, bank, or some other holder. The
issue of the state's power to affect the rights of absentee depositors,
insureds, or beneficiaries ceased to be the central issue when the legisla-
tive tide in the state legislatures turned from escheat-type statutes to
custodial-type. Under the latter, claimants were entitled to claim their
"property" from the custody-taking state at any time, and few non-
residents would complain if a state, and its solvency, became their
debtor. In fact, in those cases where the claimant, resident or non-
resident, was barred from suing the insurance company or bank, such
as where the applicable statute of limitations had run, the claimant was
actually benefited by the fact that the state took custody of his prop-
erty. In place of a claim against a private debtor barred by the statute
of limitations, he was given a right to sue the escheating state at any
time.30
Justice Jackson, in dissent, thought that the majority opinion
either cut off the rights of other states, or doomed the insurance com-
panies to double or multiple liability. He construed the Court's opinion
relative to New York's jurisdiction to be based upon an examination
of whether New York possessed sufficient contacts with the transaction
30 But ef. Application of Barber, 274 App. Div. 712, 87 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1949). The
significance of the running of the statute of limitations upon the escheat power of a state
has been much debated. See Ely, supra note 8; Ely, "Escheats: Perils and Precautions,"
15 Bus. Law. 791 (1960); Shestack, "Disposition of Unclaimed Property-A Proposed
Model Act," 46 Il1. L. Rev. 48 (1951). Most of the state escheat statutes provide ex-
pressly that the running of the statute of limitations will not bar the escheating state's
claim. See Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act § 16, 9A Uniform Laws Ann.
267 (1957). Some states have held that the expiration of the limitation period creates a
vested right protected by state constitutional provisions. See Standard Oil Co. v. New
Jersey, 5 N.J. 281, 74 A.2d 565 (1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 428 (1951). The federal due
process clause is not involved. See Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620 (1885) ; Chase Sec.
Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304 (1945). Because the limitations period for many of
the claims covered by the escheat laws often does not begin to run until there is a demand
for the property, instances where the state escheats property upon which the statute has
run are not as numerous as writers make out. See "Developments in the Law: Statutes
of Limitations," 63 Harv. L. Rev. 1177 (1950) ; Note, "The Lost Shareholder," 62 Harv.
L. Rev. 295 (1948).
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to make it reasonable for New York to take custody of the funds. Such
language, of course, is reminiscent of International Shoe Co. v. Wash-
ington3" and other cases involving the limits of the judicial power of a
state over foreign corporations. Justice Jackson brought into focus the
real problem-that of competing claims of several states-by suggest-
ing that the sufficient contacts test would indicate that "other states
have equally good grounds (i.e., 'sufficient contacts') to escheat the
same claims."32 He lectured the majority:
While we may evade it for a time, the competition and conflict
between states for "escheats" will force us to some lawyerlike defi-
nition of state power over the subject ...
This competition and conflict between states already require
us, in all fairness to them, to define the basis on which a state may
escheat."
The opinion in the next case, Standard Oil Company v. New
Jersey, 4 failed to contain a "lawyerlike definition" of the rights of
competing states. Standard Oil was incorporated in New Jersey, but
owned no tangible property in New Jersey except its stock and transfer
books. The state brought suit to escheat twelve shares of Standard Oil
common stock and unclaimed dividends. The stock was issued and the
dividends held in other states; the last-known addresses of the stock-
holders were in other states and foreign countries. The state court
judgment escheating the unclaimed property was affirmed by the Su-
preme Court over Standard Oil's objection that New Jersey was depriv-
ing it of property without due process of law because the judgment
would not be binding upon nonresident shareholders, nor upon other
states seeking to escheat the same intangibles.
The Court's opinion reverted to the test mentioned in the Security
Savings Bank case. The opinion explained the Security case with the
statement that seizure of the deposit, by personal service upon the
debtor-bank, made the deposit subject to the same control as if the
property involved was "tangible property." Applying this test to the
Standard Oil case, the majority opinion held that personal service upon
the corporation-debtor effected "a seizure" of the property, and gave
power to cut off the rights of absentee owners. The implication of the
holding was that anytime a corporate-debtor was subject to the personal
judicial jurisdiction of a state, that state could effect a seizure of the
obligations and, after giving the absentee-claimants notice and oppor-
31 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
32 Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, supra note 26, at 559 (dissenting
opinion).
33 Id. at 563.
34 341 U.S. 428 (1951).
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tunity to present their claims, could cut off their rights. The Court
went on to hold that other state courts would be bound under the full
faith and credit clause to recognize that absentee-claimants no longer
owned a claim against the corporate-debtor. The Court equated the
case to the power of a state by garnishment proceedings to affect a
nonresident creditor's claim where the garnishment proceedings were
instituted by personal service upon a nonresident debtor-garnishee
temporarily in the garnishing state.35
Thus, Standard Oil was protected against suits by absentee claim-
ants in the other forty-nine states by the full faith and credit clause, but
what about protection from suits instituted by other escheating states?
The Court handled this in one sentence: "The claim of no other state
to this property is before us and, of course, determination of any right
of a claimant state against New Jersey must await presentation here."36
(Emphasis added.)
Was this not an indication that Standard Oil could not be sued
elsewhere by another claimant state, and that another state with notions
about escheating the same property would have to battle the sovereign
state of New Jersey and not pick on Standard Oil?
Justices Frankfurter and Jackson, dissenting, did not construe the
majority opinion to leave open the rights of other claimant states to
contend with New Jersey. They viewed the Court's opinion as forever
foreclosing the claims of other states to the same property. Thus, they
foresaw an escheat race among all the states with power to subject the
corporate-debtor to personal jurisdiction. Certainly such a result would
be chaotic. One can visualize conflicting decisions concerning the de-
marcation line for the finish of such a race-e.g., does the purse belong
to the first state to start an escheat action, or to the first state to obtain
a judgment in a trial court, or to the first state to obtain a final judg-
ment from the highest court in a state, or to the first state to obtain
payment of the money from the debtor? The ugly spectacle of state
courts enjoining litigants in other state courts is suggested too.37
Justice Douglas also dissented. He agreed that the opinion fore-
closed forever other state claimants. He pointed out that the New
Jersey statute involved was of the escheat type, and from this he con-
cluded that New Jersey could not be sued by another state.
Thus far, no Supreme Court decision had blocked any state effort
to escheat intangibles. More specifically, no person or private corpora-
tion had successfully resisted state action to escheat intangible property
35 Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
36 Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, supra note 34, at 443.
37 Cf. James v. Grand Trunk W.R.R., 14 III. 2d 356, 152 N.E.2d 858 (1958).
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by pleading that the judgment of the escheating state would not protect
the debtor from the claims of other states, and that the first state de-
prived the debtor of property without due process of law.
The success of state escheat efforts came to an abrupt halt with the
next Supreme Court decision, Western Union Company v. Pennsyl-
vania.3 Western Union is incorporated and has its principal place of
business in New York, but engages in business in all fifty states, the
District of Columbia, and foreign countries. Every year thousands of
customers "telegraph" money to other persons. In some cases the re-
ceiver cannot be located within 72 hours, and the originating office is so
notified. 9 Sometimes the originating office cannot locate the sender.
Pennsylvania sought to escheat this "property" unclaimed by either
the sender or the receiver for seven years if the telegram was dis-
patched from a Pennsylvania office of Western Union. Pennsylvania
claimed the property whether or not the destination office or the payee
was in Pennsylvania or in other states.
Again, as in previous cases, the debtor claimed that the Pennsyl-
vania judgment did not discharge its liability to other claimants (in-
cluding other states), and that Pennsylvania courts deprived the com-
pany of its property without due process of law. New York had already
seized and escheated part of the funds claimed by Pennsylvania.
Justice Black, writing for the Court, agreed. Pennsylvania's
judgment could not bind New York, an entity not a party to the action.
Thus, if the Pennsylvania judgment were allowed to stand and was
satisfied by Western Union, New York would be free, notwithstanding
the full faith and credit clause, to institute proceedings against Western
Union to escheat the same funds. And if New York courts held that
the escheat legislation of that state applied to the funds, Western Union
would have to "pay a single debt more than once" and this would "take
its property without due process of law. .... 0
Thus Western Union, which during the course of the case aban-
doned its claim to retain the money,4 found itself still in possession.
Logically a suit by New York against Western Union in the courts of
New York, to which Pennsylvania was not a party, would be defeated
by Western Union's plea that due process is lacking because New York
cannot bind Pennsylvania. Until some way is found out of this dilemma,
obligors will be able to retain possession of a large portion of the in-
tangible property covered by the state statutes.
38 Western Union Co. v. Pennsylvania, supra note 1.
39 Also, sometimes drafts delivered to either the receiver or sender are not cashed.
40 Western Union Co. v. Pennsylvania, supra note 1, at 77.
41 Id. at 73 n.2.
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The Western Union case served to block efforts of Illinois to
escheat approximately $700,000 due upon policies issued by the
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, a mutual life insurance com-
pany chartered by New York, doing business in all fifty states, and
having its principal place of business in New York.4" The insurance
company secured a three judge federal district court injunction en-
joining the Illinois Director of Finance from requiring compliance with
the Illinois act. The property was escheatable under the Illinois statute
because the last-known address, according to the records of the com-
pany, of the person entitled to the funds was in Illinois. The New
York act escheated sums due upon life insurance policies if the policies
were issued for delivery in New York and upon the life of a New
York resident.
The opinion in the Western Union case leaves several issues in
doubt. First, it is unclear whether, in the absence of claims by at least
one other state, Pennsylvania could escheat the money and give West-
ern Union a good defense against claimants who are not sister states.
Suppose, for example, State A has a law escheating unclaimed utility
deposits where the utility is incorporated in A and the deposits are
made in A. Suppose further that the last-known addresses of all of the
claimants are in State B, but that B either has no escheat law of any
kind or has one which does not escheat the deposits, even when the
debtor is doing business in B and thus subject to B's judicial jurisdic-
tion. If procedural due process is satisfied,4" it would seem that State
A should be permitted to escheat the deposits, i.e., a judgment in A
would cut off the rights of the unknown claimants even if they were
nonresidents. Any other holding would permit the utility to reap a
windfall, at least with respect to a considerable amount of the deposits,
because experience has demonstrated that only a small percentage of
the private claimants ever are discovered.
Supreme Court escheat cases prior to the Western Union case had
decided that private claimants were cut off and that such judgments
were entitled to full faith and credit in other states. The Western Union
opinion can be read as leaving unaffected these prior holdings where
no competing claims of sister states are involved.
A second issue left nebulous by the Western Union opinion is
what degree of danger of double or multiple liability to sister states
must the debtor show before the due process argument will defeat the
efforts of the escheating state? The opinion refers to New York's
claims as "aggressive," "actual," "active" and "persistent." 4 These
42 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Knight, 210 F. Supp. 78 (S.D. Ill. 1962).
43 See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
44 Western Union Co. v. Pennsylvania, supra note 1, at 76.
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are not words of exact dimensions. Permitting a debtor to defeat the
escheat efforts of a state by the sole argument that some other state
might some day enact a statute or amend its existing statute to escheat
the same funds, unduly hampers the efforts of the escheating state
without adequate reason. If the second state should enact an escheat
statute in the future, or amend an old law, to cover the same property,
the debtor may have to pay twice45 Any unfairness is but the price
that entities doing business across state lines in a federal system must
pay.
One thing is clear after the Western Union case: where the claims
of a second state are aggressive and persistent, Western Union, and not
Pennsylvania, will retain possession of the money. A holding that this
should be the temporary resting place of the unclaimed money was
certainly not the only way that the Court could save for later decision
the competing claims of New York and Pennsylvania.
As between Western Union and the State of Pennsylvania, might
not the Supreme Court have decided that Pennsylvania had power to
order Western Union to pay over the money to the State of Pennsyl-
vania and to give Western Union a discharge good against the whole
world, including New York? At the same time, might not the Supreme
Court have held that Pennsylvania lacked the power to foreclose New
York's right to the funds and that after the decision, the way was still
open for New York to bring an action against Pennsylvania to de-
termine the final right to the property? Of course, such a result leaves
unanswered the question: how does Pennsylvania obtain power to de-
clare that New York no longer has any rights against Western Union?
If Pennsylvania lacks power to conclude New York as against the
claims of Pennsylvania, what gives Pennsylvania power to conclude
New York with respect to New York's claim against Western Union?
Do not the two issues rise and fall together, and depend upon whether
Pennsylvania had "jurisdiction"?
It is submitted that the two issues do not necessarily rise and fall
together. If we adhere to notions of in rem and quasi-in-rem jurisdic-
tion, we are apt to reason either that Pennsylvania cannot conclude New
York at all, or that Pennsylvania may destroy New York's claim
against everyone-Western Union and Pennsylvania. Our notions of
state power over intangibles are still affected by theories that were de-
veloped in cases involving tangibles. Thus, courts still frequently de-
cide cases upon the basis that an intangible has a situs in a certain
43 A debtor would not have to pay twice if the second escheating state's only action
is not against the debtor, but instead, against the first escheating state; or if the second
state recovers from the debtor, and the debtor is permitted indemnity from the first
escheating state. Cf. Cities Service Co. v. McGrath, 342 U.S. 330 (1952).
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place, although the same opinion will frequently admit that the con-
cept of situs is fictional when intangibles are involved. It was exactly
this type of reasoning which led the Supreme Court into trouble. In
the Security Savings Bank case, ideas of in rem and quasi-in-rem juris-
diction were mixed with a fictional situs of intangibles, and this mixture
pointed logically to a holding that any state which secured personal
jurisdiction over the debtor brought intangibles within the in rem or
quasi-in-rem jurisdiction of the courts of that state and all claimants
were thereafter bound.
Judicial precedent prior to the Western Union case made clear
that state power over intangibles, exercised by judicial power over the
debtor, depended upon what the state sought to do with the intangible.
If the state ordered the debtor to pay the debt to a creditor of a non-
resident, such judgment bound the nonresident and destroyed any
claim the nonresident had against the debtor.4 6 However, if the state
ordered the debtor to pay the debt to someone other than the non-
resident's creditor, state power was found lacking.47 Thus in the West-
ern Union case, a holding that Pennsylvania had power to cut off New
York's rights against Western Union and substitute instead a claim
against Pennsylvania would not do violence to judicial precedent.
If we look at the effect of such a holding upon the rights of New
York, no substantial harm appears. If it be argued that such a result
deprives New York of its rights to sue Western Union in New York's
own courts, the answer is that such a suit today will be unavailing be-
cause Western Union may plead the due process clause in the New
York action, just as it did in the Pennsylvania action. If it be urged
that such a result deprives New York of a defendant that cannot plead
the defense of sovereign immunity, the answer is that now New York, if
it ever hopes to settle which state-itself or Pennsylvania-has the
superior escheat power, will be forced to invoke the original jurisdic-
tion of the Supreme Court.
There is another reason to doubt the correctness of the Western
Union opinion as a universal proposition. Take an escheat proceeding
involving the exact Western Union facts, but suppose that the escheat
statute of Pennsylvania contained a provision, like section 14 of the
Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act, reading:
Any holder who has paid moneys to the State Treasurer pursuant to
this act may make payment to any person appearing to such holder
to be entitled thereto, and upon proof of such payment and proof
40 Harris v. Balk, supra note 35.
47 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S. 518 (1916).
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that the payee was entitled thereto, the State Treasurer shall forth-
with reimburse the holder for the payment.48
If Pennsylvania provides Western Union full indemnity against
paying the debt twice, is it true that Pennsylvania is taking property
from Western Union without due process of law? It should be pointed
out that the Uniform Act defines "person" to include "any . . . gov-
ernment or political subdivision." '49
The Supreme Court has held that indemnity guaranteeing a debtor
protection against paying the same debt twice will save what would
otherwise be an unlawful taking of property. In Cities Service Com-
pany v. McGrath,5 the Attorney General had vested, pursuant to the
Trading With the Enemy Act, two bearer debentures issued by Cities
Service Company. One of the debentures was outside the United
States, its whereabouts unknown. The Attorney General brought suit
against Cities Service to compel payment of the debentures. Cities
Service objected that a judgment against it would take its property
without due process of law because a foreign court might later hold the
obligor liable upon the debentures. The Supreme Court agreed that
there was a chance that Cities Service "might suffer judgment, the
payment of which would effect a double recovery,"'" but that:
In that event, petitioners [Cities Service] will have the right
to recoup from the United States, for a "taking" of their property
within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, "just compensation"
to the extent of their double liability .... [O]nly with this assur-
ance against double liability can it fairly be said that the present
seizure is not itself an unconstitutional taking of petitioners' prop-
erty.
52
It would follow from this that if some statutory or constitutional
provision provided Western Union indemnity against double recovery,
Pennsylvania's judgment ordering Western Union to pay the money to
Pennsylvania would not deprive Western Union of property without
due process of law. Furthermore, one might wonder whether the ration-
ale of the Cities Service opinion is not a complete and adequate answer
to New York's argument that Pennsylvania harms New York interests
unconstitutionally when the Pennsylvania judgment destroys New
48 Admittedly, the phrase "proof that the payee was entitled thereto" remains to be
construed.
49 Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act § 1 (g), 9A Uniform Laws Ann.
254 (1957).
50 342 U.S. 330 (1952).
51 Id. at 335.
52 Id. at 335-336.
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York's rights against Western Union but substitutes a cause of action
against Pennsylvania.53
This method of handling the multiple-escheat problem was not
adopted by the Western Union opinion. The telegraph company still
has the money and neither of the competing states has any. The
stakes involved will not let the matter rest here, of that we can be
assured. Thus it is appropriate to ask: What may be the course of his-
tory with respect to multiple-escheat issues? Several avenues are open:
some legislative, some judicial and some of a private nature.
Any judicial solution to the problem must bring together all of the
competing claimants, states and otherwise, before a single court where
all may present their claims and where a single judgment will bind all.
Bringing such a result to fruition is complicated where states are
claimants because of sovereign immunity. Invocation of the ordinary
and familiar statutory interpleader procedure of the federal courts can-
not be used,54 and thus it is no solution even if we ignore the problems
presented by claims amounting to less than $500" and solve the di-
versity of citizenship requirements.56 The way is always open for one
state to consent to the jurisdiction of another. However, the result of
one case where Massachusetts intervened in a New Jersey proceeding
to escheat unclaimed dividends would indicate limited future use of this
technique.57 This is not to criticize the New Jersey court for deciding
in favor of its own state, but only to point out that most of the double
escheat claims will involve competing statutory bases for escheat, each
having an equally arguable claim for recognition. In such an evenly
balanced situation, a court cannot be "wrong" in preferring the claims
of the state wherein it sits.
53 Section 19 of the Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act provides:
Any person claiming an interest in any property delivered to the state under
this act may file a claim thereto or to the proceeds from the sale thereof on the
form prescribed by the [State Treasurer].
If Pennsylvania had enacted such a provision, and if the Supreme Court had required
Western Union to pay the money to Pennsylvania, there is a possibility that were West-
ern Union compelled by a New York judgment to pay New York a second time, Western
Union might have been able to recover from Pennsylvania by arguing that New York
could have filed a claim with the Pennsylvania State Treasurer, under the above-quoted
language, and that Western Union was equitably subrogated to New York's rights under
the quoted section. Cf. State v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 29 N.J. Super. 116, 101
A.2d 598 (1953). New York in all probability would not desire to present a claim upon
its own behalf under this section.
54 Worcester County Trust Co. v. Riley, 302 U.S. 292 (1937).
55 62 Stat. 931 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1335.
56 A state itself is not a "citizen of a state." Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Alabama,
155 U.S. 482 (1894).
57 State v. American Sugar Refining Co., 20 N.J. 286, 119 A.2d 767 (1956).
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It would appear that state courts and federal courts below the
highest court in the land are incapable of binding both states, and thus
the only judicial solution lies in the invocation of the original jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court. The opinion in the Western Union case recognizes
this. One state may sue another in the original jurisdiction of the United
States Supreme Court for a declaration of rights concerning the escheat
of abandoned property. It would seem clear that a "case or contro-
versy" exists because the two or more states are claiming the same
property 8
A problem may exist if the holder is joined as a party to the orig-
inal action. For example, suppose that New York brings an original
Supreme Court action against Pennsylvania, and joins Western Union
as a party defendant. The issue is whether the case remains within the
constitutional grant of original jurisdiction of the United States Su-
preme Court after such joinder. Western Union, a New York corpora-
tion, is a citizen of New York, and New York could not have sued
Western Union in the original jurisdiction of the United States Supreme
Court, had Western Union been the sole defendant. There are Supreme
Court holdings that the presence of a party who could not have been sued
is fatal to the original jurisdiction, and that it makes no difference
whether the additional party be characterized as "proper," "necessary,"
or "indispensable."' 9 The same procedural difficulty would arise if New
York were to make defendants some claimants who were New York
citizens. The Western Union opinion, however, seems to contemplate
no original jurisdiction difficulties from this direction."" A holding that
Pennsylvania possessed power to cut off all nonstate claimants to the
funds and to take custody away from Western Union would have ob-
viated whatever difficulties are presented by these procedural problems.
The original action would then have been solely a contest between two
or more states.
The Western Union opinion contemplates that the Supreme Court,
in original actions, will face the task of choosing which state possesses
the primary power to escheat various types of intangible property. The
opinion refused to give any hint of what solution the Court will adopt.
Justice Stewart was not so reticent. His memorandum opinion as-
signed primary escheat power to the state incorporating the holder, at
58 Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398 (1939).
59 California v. Southern Pac. Co., 157 U.S. 229 (1895); Texas v. Interstate Com-
merce Comm'n, 258 U.S. 158 (1922); Louisiana v. Cummins, 314 U.S. 577 (1941); Hart
and Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System 226-227 (1953). Contra, Texas
v. Florida, supra note 58, at 405.
60 Western Union Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71, 80 n.6 (1961).
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least where that state was also the situs of the holder's principal office."
Only one other Justice has indicated any views concerning where the
ultimate escheat power is vested where multistate contacts exist, and
this only in dissent. In the Moore case, Justice Jackson stated that the
power to escheat rested upon actual or constructive dominion over the
property, or sovereignty over the person of the claimant.6 2 However,
as even the Justice himself admitted, these two concepts, while they
might clearly dictate a lack of power in New York to escheat un-
claimed insurance money simply because New York was the domicile
of the insured when the policy was issued, would fail to provide an
answer where one state claimed intangibles because of its dominion
over the property and the other state claimed escheat power based upon
sovereignty over the claimant.
One might suggest that an existing conflict doctrine already assigns
primary power to the state possessing dominion over the claimant. This
is the doctrine that mobilia sequuntur personam. The fact is that there
is no general acceptance of this doctrine as applied to escheat even
though it is generally applicable to the distribution of the personalty
of a decedent dying intestate with heirs.6 The state of the situs of the
property will not always defer to the power of the owner's domicile at
death when the issue is escheat. These cases thus indicate that we may
really have a doctrine that the situs state always possesses the primary
power; that in matters of succession the situs state usually refers to the
law of the domicile, and that for many years we have had a rather large
scale application of the renvoi principle without recognition of that
fact.63a If this is true, the general rule heretofore followed in both suc-
cession and escheat is that the situs state possesses the final power to
apply its own law to the property.
This does not indicate where the situs is. Situs as applied to in-
tangibles is fictitious," and the Court would be better advised to de-
cide the multiple-escheat problem without reference to the term. The
ultimate issue then is whether the state with contacts respecting the
property is more or less important than the state which has contacts
tied to the owner or claimant. Although the competing interests are
61 Id. at 80.
62 Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, supra note 26, at 560-62 (dissenting
opinion).
63 See State v. American Sugar Refining Co., supra note 57; Annot., 50 A.L.R.2d
1375 (1956); 2 Beale, Conflict of Laws § 309.1 (1935); Restatement, Conflict of Laws
§§ 309, 471-484 (1934).
63a Griswold, "Renvoi Revisited," 51 Harv. L. Rev. 1165, 1194-1198 (1938).
64 Severnoe Sec. Corp. v. London & Lancashire Ins. Co., 255 N.Y. 120, 123-124, 174
N.E. 299, 300 (1931).
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fairly evenly balanced, the contacts respecting the property should
prevail. The state whose contacts are tied to the claimant usually must
rest its argument upon the fact that at some particular time the claim-
ant bore some relationship to the state, e.g., domicile. Since the exact
whereabouts of the owner at the time a state escheats the property is
unknown, the state relying upon contacts with the owner cannot show
that their contact continued until the date the power to escheat is
exercised.
This is the same point which Justice Jackson mentioned in the
Moore opinion; that is, New York's power to escheat rested upon the
fact that at the time the policies were issued, the insured was a New
York resident. Many years had passed after that date and Justice
Jackson thought New York's claim was weaker than a state's claim
founded upon the grant of corporate powers to the holder. This same
weakness exists where the escheating state bases its power upon the
fact that a beneficiary, a stockholder, or a depositor was domiciled in
the state at some time in the past. Many of the escheating statutes
base the power of a state upon the fact that the claimant's last-known
address was in the state, and many statutes also presume that the last-
known address of the claimant is identical to the last address exhibited
by company records. Is this not an attempt to make legally known
what is impossible to prove, and to base the escheat power upon what
might be true rather than upon what is demonstrably true? And finally
is it not better and more just to assign the ultimate escheat power to a
state which can demonstrate its present relationship to property rather
than to a state which must rest its power upon a relationship to a
claimant concerning which all we know is that it was true at some date
in the past?6
This leaves unsettled the issue of whether the state which in-
corporated the holder, or the state which is the locus of the holder's
principal place of business shall have the paramount escheat power. In
this instance both states rest their power upon a relationship to the
property. Perhaps multiple incorporations will make difficult the appli-
cation of a rule that the state which incorporates the holder has para-
mount power.6  However, the "principal place of business" concept is
05 See Note, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 1403 (1952); Recent Developments, 62 Colum. L.
Rev. 708 (1962); Comment, 59 Mich. L. Rev. 756 (1961). But see Note, 27 Ind. L.J.
113 (1951) ; Shestack, supra note 30. If the holder looked for the claimant at the record
address and found him, the property is not unclaimed; if the search at the record address
failed to find the owner, the odds are that he is not there, nor near there. The book
address appears a slim reed upon which to rest escheat power.
66 The prevalence of the practice of dual incorporation is not so great as to make
this a problem of much magnitude. Railroad corporations are affected and they are
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not free from difficulty.6 7 In fact, it might result in no more solution of
the multiple-escheat problem than the concept of domicile has in the
elimination of double imposition of death taxes.68
Legislative solutions may appear at the federal or state level. A
federal escheat law has been suggested,6 9 and it may become a reality if
more states move to escheat intangibles having a federal origin, such as
federal income tax refunds and unclaimed federal bond interest and
principal.7" Valid federal escheat laws would eliminate the multiple-
escheat problem for the property subject to the federal laws. State
legislation is more probable. This may take the form of state legisla-
tion authorizing state officials to compromise cases where one or more
states seek to escheat the same funds,71 or perhaps state laws using some
form of arbitration machinery. 72 A more common legislative solution
is the enactment of a uniform law which specifies the conditions or
contacts necessary for escheat. Already, of course, this remedy is in
use.74 If the language of the act grants the power to escheat to a state
having contacts that may not exist except with reference to a single
state, the problem of multiple escheat is eliminated. The Uniform Act
does this for insurance proceeds, public utility deposits and refunds,
and property held by state courts and public officers. 75 For example, in-
surance proceeds are escheatable, under the Uniform Act, only by the
state which was the "last known address, according to the records of
the corporation, of the person entitled to the funds .... ,7' The
drafters of the act rejected the claim of the state incorporating the
company because "it would concentrate the administrative burdens in
the few states that incorporate most of the insurance companies, and
also because such reliance would result in the same few states obtain-
ing the use of the bulk of the unclaimed funds. .... M7
holders of certain kinds of property covered by the escheat laws, e.g., dividends, unpaid
wages, and bond payments.
67 Cf. Sperry Products v. Association of Am. R.R., 132 F.2d 408, 412 (2d Cir. 1942)
(dissenting opinion). See 72 Stat. 415 (1958), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c).
68 Cf. In re Dorrance's Estate, 309 Pa. 151, 163 AtI. 303 (1932); In re Dorrance's
Estate, 115 N.J. Eq. 268, 170 Aft. 601 (1934).
69 Note, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 1408, 1413 (1952).
70 California and Florida statutes claim escheat power over federal tax refunds and
bond payments.
71 Uniform Act on Interstate Compromise of Death Taxes, 9B Uniform Laws Ann.
224 (1957) (Adopted in nine states).
72 Cf. Uniform Act on Interstate Arbitration of Death Taxes, 9B Uniform Laws
Ann. 213 (1957) (Adopted in ten states).
74 Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act, 9A Uniform Laws Ann. 253
(1957) (Adopted in ten states).
75 Id. §§ 3, 4, and 8.
76 Id. § 3.
77 Id. § 3, Comm'rs' Note.
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On the other hand the Uniform Act establishes for some types of
property dual standards for escheat. For example, undistributed
dividends may be escheated either by the state incorporating the com-
pany or by the state in which the company does business if that state
is the location of the last-known address of the person entitled to the
funds." Any such dual standard raises problems of multiple escheat, as
the drafters well knew. Accordingly, the Uniform Act contains a sec-
tion which prevents multiple escheat of property covered by the dual
standards established by other sections of the Act:"9
If two states, each having contact with the transaction, have each
adopted the Act, the jurisdictional test becomes the last known ad-
dress of the owner. Accordingly, if the holder is within the jurisdic-
tion of the state of the last known address, that state takes custody
of the unclaimed funds regardless of the domicile of the holder.8,
Solving the multiple-escheat problem by uniform legislation is not
impossible. The difficulty, as in all cases of uniform legislation, is to get
all states to enact the Uniform Act. Unless many more states enact it,
the multiple-escheat problem will remain for Supreme Court resolu-
tion. As is readily apparent from the above discussion, the drafters of
the Uniform Act did not choose to give paramount power to the in-
corporating state. Instead they chose the state of the owner's last-
known residence as carried on the books of the corporation. Reference
to the book address will prevent two states from finding that each is
the last-known address of the owner upon conflicting evidence.
In choice of law problems, cases and articles have recently argued
that choice of the governing law should depend upon an evaluation of
the policies of the several states which would be affected by application
of the various local laws involved."' After the various policies are
segregated, and the harmful or helpful effects of the application of the
various local laws gauged, the governing law is based upon a balancing
of the interests. This technique seems ill-suited to the problem of
multiple escheat. For example, two of the basic state interests involved
in escheat are (1) protecting and conserving the absentee's property
awaiting his return or identification, and (2) earmarking the property
for the use of all of the state's inhabitants if the owner does not appear.
The former we might call the "custodial" interest; the latter the
78 Id. § 5.
79 Id. § 10.
80 Id. § 10, Comm'rs' Note.
81 Cf. Cavers, "A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem," 47 Harv. L. Rev. 173
(1933); Hancock, "The Rise and Fall of Buckeye v. Buckeye, 1931-1959: Marital Immu-
nity for Torts in Conflict of Laws," 29 U. Chi. L. Rev. 237 (1962) ; Pearson v. Northeast
Air Lines, 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962).
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"crevenue" interest. It seems impossible to determine which state, e.g.,
the state of incorporation or the state of the last-known residence of
the owner, would provide the greatest assurance that the owner would
be found. 2 There is not enough patterning of human nature to con-
clude where an absentee would be most likely to look for his lost prop-
erty, or to conclude where published or posted notices would be most
likely to come to the attention of the absentee and remind him of the
fact that he owns unclaimed property.
Likewise, it seems impossible to draw general conclusions concern-
ing which state contributed most to the earning or protection of the
property and thus has the superior "revenue" interest. The facts may
vary greatly with respect to a single type of unclaimed property. For
example, the unclaimed Western Union money orders might have been
telegraphed from Pennsylvania by a New York citizen who stopped
temporarily at a Pennsylvania Western Union office while en route to
a west coast vacation. On the other hand, the sender might have been
a Pennsylvania citizen who was born and raised in Pennsylvania and
who earned all of his property in that state.
No doubt, counsel for companies subject to escheat laws are work-
ing upon private arrangements to eliminate the problem of multiple
escheat or to frustrate entirely the power of any state to escheat the
property. If the ultimate power to escheat is held to reside in the state
which is the last book address of the owner, corporation counsel may
be able to fashion private arrangements so that the corporation is not
subject to multiple escheat and also alleviate some of the administra-
tive burden of filing reports in several states. Corporations may even
devise private arrangements either by means of charter or by-law pro-
visions, or private contracts, which will pass ownership of the unclaimed
property to the corporation after it is abandoned for a certain number
of years-the number of years being less than the period specified in
the escheat laws. 3 Time will tell whether interest in good stockholder
and depositor relations will prevent these private arrangements from
coming into existence. Time will also tell whether these private ar-
rangements effectively frustrate the escheat power of a state and
whether the private arrangements remain inviolate from hostile state
82 It would seem that the last address shown by the books of the holder is not
where the owner will be found. If he were still there, presumably the holder would have
found him. Holders do make efforts to pay property to the owners-in fact, there is
evidence that the wide-spread enactment of escheat laws will spur holders to greater effort
to find owners. See McBride, "Unclaimed Dividends, Escheat Statutes and the Corpora-
tion Lawyer," 14 Bus. Law. 1062, 1073 (1959).
83 Note, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 1408, 1409 (1952); Note, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 295 (1948).
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counterattack under the due process clause and the contract clause of
the Constitution.
The cases which are certain to follow Western Union will force
the Supreme Court to chart some exact boundaries of state power even
though in the narrow area of escheat. The nature of the issue will not
permit the Court to mark some general boundaries, leaving each state
free to apply its own criteria for escheat provided the criteria chosen
are reasonable.'5 As the Court develops the demarcation line of the
escheat power, the Court may develop a readiness to consider other
conflict problems under clauses of the Constitution. If the future brings
a more active Supreme Court along these lines, the teacher of con-
flicts will become more of a constitutional law teacher than in the past.
84 Compare the present relationship between clauses of the federal constitution and
state compensation laws and awards. Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident
Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939); Watson v. Employers Liability Assur. Corp., 348 U.S. 66
(1954); Industrial Comm'n of Wisconsin v. McCartin, 330 U.S. 622 (1947).
